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WHAT'S THE SCORE?: DOES THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
PROTECT PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES?
Pamela Edwards*
INTRODUCTION
For nearly forty-five years, courts have protected the marketable
identity of professional athletes and other celebrities in a number of
factual settings, under the rubric of "the right of publicity."' During
that time, changes in technology have altered the concept of what
constitutes a protectible, marketable identity. This Article dis-
cusses: (1) the breadth of this protection as applied to athletes,
groups of athletes; and (2) whether it applies to sports leagues.
In doing so, this Article examines: (1) what constitutes the right
of publicity; (2) whether the right applies to sports leagues; and (3)
whether sports leagues can use the right of publicity to, inter alia,
restrict the dissemination of scores and statistics while games are
in progress. To provide a paradigm for how sports leagues could
use the right to protect its interests, this Article uses the National
Basketball Association ("NBA" or "League") as a prototype. Re-
cently, the NBA brought suit against a company that provides "real-
time," that is, virtually contemporaneous, updates of sporting
events. 2 The NBA brought several federal causes of action, includ-
Assistant Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law at Queens College. I thank everyone
who read and commented on this Article, including those individuals who attended the writ-
ing workshop at the Third Annual Northeast People of Color Conference, held at Touro Law
Center on March 27-29, 1998, at which I presented a draft of this Article. I especially thank
Leonard M. Baynes, Western New England College School of Law, who acted as commenta-
tor on the Article. Although this Article improved as a result of the comments of all these
individuals, any potentially controversial positions that remain are my own. I also thank
Silvia Montalban, Hofstra University School of Law, Class of 1998, for her invaluable re-
search assistance.
1 See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (discussing Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953)). The Haelan court coined the term "the right of pub-
licity." See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 133 (Wis. 1979)
(discussing the intrinsic nature of the tort of appropriation).
2 NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (defining the specific type
of service that was the basis for the dispute).
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ing Lanham Act 3 claims, copyright infringement claims, as well as
state common law causes of action.4 Although the NBA brought a
New York State common law "hot-news" misappropriation cause of
action, it did not bring a right of publicity cause of action, probably
because of New York state courts' position that there is no separate
common law right of publicity outside of the New York Civil Rights
sections 50 and 51.5 Part I of this Article discusses how the NBA
would have fared had it brought a right of publicity cause of action
in other jurisdictions assuming that the League has a marketable
identity.6 Part II examines whether leagues have a protectible
marketable identity independent of the marketable identities of
their constituent athletes and, if such a protectible marketable in-
terest does exist, whether game statistics and scores evoke this
identity v The Article concludes that, in those states that recognize
the right of publicity, that right would protect a marketable identity
of sports leagues independent of the marketable identity of individ-
ual athletes.8
3 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994). The Lanham Act provides a civil cause of action for, inter
alia, unauthorized uses of a symbol, which uses constitute "false designation of origin" or
false descriptions. See Resource Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found.,
Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 1991) (detailing the two principal causes of action under sec-
tion 1125); see also infra notes 241-42 and accompanying text (discussing claims brought un-
der the Lanham Act).
4 See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 844 (indicating that the state law causes of action included
unfair competition by misappropriation, false advertising, and false designation of origin).
5 See, e.g., Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 583-84 (N.Y.
1984); Aaron J. Reber & Karin Mika, Commercial Exploitation or Protected Use? Stern v.
Delphi Internet Services Corporation and the Erosion of the Right of Publicity, 13 TOURO L.
REV. 207, 212-18 (1996) (acknowledging the existence of the statutory right of publicity in
New York). State and federal courts have held that these sections of the Civil Rights Law
protect only natural persons. See, e.g., Chaplin v. NBC, 15 F.R.D. 134, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1953)
(holding that the statutory right of privacy "is purely personal"); Rosemont Enters. v. Ran-
dom House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122, 129 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (observing that the right of publicity
'recognizes the pecuniary value which attaches to the names and pictures of public figures"),
affid, 255 N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 1969); Schumann v. Loew's Inc., 135 N.Y.S.2d 361, 365 (Sup. Ct.
1954) (pointing out that the statute protects only "living person[s]").
6 See infra notes 9-74 and accompanying text (discussing the right of publicity).
7 See infra notes 75-132 and accompanying text (outlining the scope of the right of public-
ity).
8 See infra notes 133-282 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of the right
of publicity to professional sports leagues).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The Right of Publicity Defined
The right of publicity protects athletes' and celebrities' market-
able identities from commercial misappropriation by recognizing
their right to control and profit from the use of their names and
nicknames, 9 likenesses, 0 portraits," performances (under certain
circumstances), 12 biographical facts, 13 symbolic representations,14 or
anything else that evokes this marketable identity. 5 Thus, any
trait that uniquely identifies celebrities or athletes implicates their
marketable identities. "'[T]he reaction of the public to name and
likeness, which may be fortuitous or which may be managed and
9 See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129 (Wis. 1979) (chronicling the dis-
pute between a former professional football player and a shaving gel manufacturer concern-
ing the use of the "Crazylegs" nickname).
10 See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that a nude drawing
of an African American male seated in a boxing ring evoked Muhammad Ali's marketable
identity and violated his right of publicity).
11 See, e.g., Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953)
(discussing the unauthorized use of baseball players' pictures on baseball cards to market
chewing gum); Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933-34 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (dealing
with the unauthorized use of a photograph emblazoned on articles of clothing, though the
photograph did not clearly identify individual players).
12 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (resolving that the
broadcast of a performer's entire act in a news program violated the performer's right of
publicity); see also Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d
663, 681 (7th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that Major League Baseball players' "rights of pub-
licity might be violated wherever their performances are broadcast without their consent").
13 See Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (ruling that the
unauthorized use of Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's former name and his college basketball statistics
violated his common law right of publicity); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277,
1283 (D. Minn. 1970) (determining that the unauthorized use of professional baseball play-
ers' names and statistics in table games violated the players' right of publicity); Palmer v.
Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (concluding that the unau-
thorized use of professional golfers' names and career statistics in a board game violated
their right of publicity).
14 See Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)
(determining that the use of a car's distinctive markings evoked that driver's marketable
identity and violated his right of publicity).
15 See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 416 (ruling that the use of an athlete's statistical record
violates the right of publicity); Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988)
(resolving that an imitation of a singer's voice in a commercial advertisement violated the
California common law right of publicity). But see Tin Pan Apple, Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
737 F. Supp. 826, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (deeming that a New York statute did not protect per-
formers against vocal imitations). However, section 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law has
been amended and now includes "voice" as a protected characteristic. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS §
51 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
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planned, endows the name and likeness of the person involved with
commercially exploitable opportunities." 16
One of the seminal right of publicity cases is Haelan Laboratories
v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.17 In Haelan, the Second Circuit coined
the term "right of publicity" which, in contrast to the right of pri-
vacy (the right of natural persons to live their lives in peace), pro-
tects the right of "prominent persons (especially... ball-players)" to
receive compensation "for authorizing advertisements, popularizing
their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subways."'8 Haelan involved a suit brought by one
chewing gum manufacturer against a rival manufacturer; the plain-
tiff alleged that the defendant induced athletes to breach their con-
tracts for the use of those athletes' pictures in the marketing of
chewing gum.' 9 The athletes signed contracts with both manufac-
turers, allowing them to use the athletes' pictures on baseball
trading cards.20 The court rejected the defendant's argument that
there is no assignable right or "interest in the publication of [a
prominent person's] picture other than his right of privacy."21 In
doing so, the court held that
in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy
(which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right
in the publicity value of his photograph .... This right of
publicity would usually yield... no money unless it could be
made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any
other advertiser from using their pictures.22
State courts have also adopted this line of reasoning. For exam-
ple, in reaching its decision in Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson, the Supreme
Court of Wisconsin distinguished the right of publicity from the
right of privacy. 23 The court clarified the right of publicity as pro-
16 Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 413 (quoting Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 431
(Cal. 1979)).
17 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
18 Id. at 868; see Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Wis. 1979)
(distinguishing the right of publicity from the right of privacy).
19 See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 867.
20 See id.
21 Id. at 868.
22 Id.
23 See Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 130, 132. The court repeatedly stressed that the focus of the
right of publicity was on the athlete's marketable identity:
A cause of action for the appropriation of a person's name for trade purposes is different
in nature from other privacy torts .... The appropriation cause of action protects not
merely the right to be let alone, but, rather, protects primarily the property rights in
the publicity value of aspects of a person's identity.
[Vol. 62
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tecting the property right in the publicity value of a person's iden-
tity.
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co. 24
"The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the
straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the
theft of good will. No social purpose is served by having the
defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would
have market value and for which he would normally pay."25
B. Historic Development of the Right of Publicity
Although the right of publicity and the right of privacy protect
different interests, courts and legal scholars have. discussed the two
in tandem.26 In fact, some scholars have stated that the right of
publicity has developed from the right of privacy.2 7 For example, in
an oft-cited law review article, William L. Prosser divided the right
of privacy into four separate torts, one of which protects against the
"[a]ppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs
name or likeness."28 There has been some disagreement concerning
whether the right of publicity is purely a tort right or whether it
Id. at 130. The court went on to state that
We conclude that the right of a person to be compensated for the use of his name for ad-
vertising purposes or purposes of trade is distinct from other privacy torts which protect
primarily the mental interest in being let alone. The appropriation tort is different be-
cause it protects primarily the property interest in the publicity value of one's name.
Id. at 132.
24 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
25 Id. at 576 (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis
Wrong?, 31 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 331 (1966)) (alteration in original).
26 See, e.g., Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 132-35 (discussing the development of both rights);
Cristina Fernandez, The Right of Publicity on the Internet, 8 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 289 (1998)
(documenting the history of the right of publicity); Ira J. Kaplan, They Can't Take that Away
from Me: Protecting Free Trade in Public Images from Right of Publicity Claims, 18 LoY. L.A.
ENT. L.J. 37 (1997) (distinguishing the right of publicity from other intellectual property
rights).
27 See 1 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, §§ 1.1-1.11 & fig.1-1
(1997) (discussing the areas of the law that contributed to the development to the right of
publicity).
28 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960) (enumerating the four
torts); see Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir. 1974)
(citing to the Prosser article); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279 (D. Minn.
1970) (utilizing Prosser's classification scheme); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458,
461 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (citing to Prosser's classification of the law of privacy);
Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 133.
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protects a property right.29 However, most courts appear to have
adopted the position that the right of publicity, unlike the general
invasion of privacy tort, "protects pecuniary and proprietary inter-
ests [rather than] emotional interests." 0
C. National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Incorporated. 31
In NBA v. Motorola, the NBA brought suit seeking relief from
Motorola's SportsTrax service which, inter alia, provides subscrib-
ers with information on scores and statistics of games in progess via
electronic pagers.32
1. The NBA v. Motorola Facts
In district court, the NBA argued that Motorola violated both the
League's copyright in the games and in the game broadcasts by dis-
seminating the scores of games in progress.33 As discussed below, 34
Motorola received information concerning games in progress from
licensed NBA broadcasts.35 The district court, using the test set out
in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,3 6 stated
that "'[t]o establish copyright infringement, "two elements must be
proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of con-
stituent elements of the work that are original.' ' 3 7 Using this test,
the court found that the NBA failed to meet the first element of the
test, ownership of a valid copyright, as to the games themselves,
29 Compare Hirsch, 280 N.W.2d at 134 (observing that the right of publicity "protects a
property right"), with Haelan Lab. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953) (stating that whether the right of publicity is "labelled a 'property' right is immaterial.
. the tag 'property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuni-
ary worth").
30 MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D.
Ill. 1998) (buttressing this position with ample authority); see Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at
1279-80 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 842-43 (3d ed. 1964)).
31 NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir.
1997).
32 See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 843-44 (indicating that the NBA's complaint asserted six
claims for relief).
33 See Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1088 (discussing the two elements of a copy-
right infringement claim).
34 See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing Motorola facts as presented in
the appellate opinion).
35 See Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1081 (noting that the defendant paid report-
ers to watch and listen to games on television and radio to obtain the information).
36 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
37 Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1088 (quoting Feist, 490 U.S. at 361).
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and failed to meet the second element of the test, a copying, as to
the broadcasts of the games.38 Following the line of cases that have
addressed the issue of the copyrightability of sporting events, the
district court held that NBA games are not protected under the
Copyright Act.3 9 The court stated that "NBA games do not consti-
tute 'original works of authorship' and thus do not fall within the
subject matter of copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. §§ 102,
103."40
As to the League's claim that Motorola violated the copyrights in
the broadcasts of the games, the court held that Motorola did not
copy any of the protected features of the broadcasts, stating:
In the instant case, although direct evidence exists that de-
fendants actually copied certain aspects of the broadcasts of
the NBA games, this evidence also reveals that defendants
copied, at most, the idea of an NBA game and facts from
specific NBA games, both of which are beyond the realm of
protectibility. 41
Next, the district court addressed the NBA's commercial misap-
propriation claim.42 The League alleged that Motorola's dissemina-
tion of the scores of games in progress violated the NBA's property
rights in the games and in the broadcasts of the games, rights that
were recognized under New York State common law.43 Motorola
asserted the defense that section 301 of the Copyright Act pre-
empted common-law misappropriation claims. 44 The court rejected
this defense in part and accepted it in part, holding that the rights
in the broadcasts were preempted because the broadcasts were
copyrightable, but that the rights in the games themselves were not
preempted because the games were not copyrightable, and thus not
governed by the Copyright Act.45 The Second Circuit reversed the
38 See Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1088.
39 See id.; see also infra notes 229-40 and accompanying text (discussing preemption by
the Federal Copyright Act).
40 Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1088.
41 Id. at 1093-94 (citing Feist, 499 U.S. at 350).
42 See id. at 1094-98 (focusing on the issue of federal preemption of state law).
43 See id. at 1094, 1098-1107 (addressing the New York common law claim of misappro-
priation).
44 See id. at 1094 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1994)).
45 See id. at 1094-98 (explaining the general scope and subject matter requirements for
preemption).
19981
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district court's holding as to the preemption of New York State's
common law misappropriation. 46
In addition to the federal copyright claims, the NBA brought
other federal claims. The League alleged that Motorola violated
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act; the NBA contended that Mo-
torola's advertising contained false designations of origin and con-
stituted false advertising.47  The district court rejected these
claims.48 The League also alleged that by taking information from
cable telecasts to transmit over the SportsTrax service, Motorola
violated the Communications Act, prohibiting unauthorized trans-
missions of interstate and foreign communications. 49
The district court held that, because the NBA did not adduce any
evidence that Motorola "intercepted" cable transmissions, and be-
cause Motorola did not play a legitimate role in cable transmis-
sions, this claim failed. 50 Thus, the district court judge dismissed
all of the NBA's claims except the New York state law misappro-
priation claim.51 On appeal, Judge Winter dismissed this claim as
well. 52
The Second Circuit framed the issue before it as centering on
the state law "hot-news" misappropriation cause of action.53
Motorola marketed a paging device, SportsTrax, which supplied
data on sporting events, including NBA games; the information was
taken from radio and television broadcasts by SportsTrax-affiliated
reporters, who then keyed this information into a computer that
transmitted the information to the pagers.5 4 SportsTrax provided
data on sporting events while they were in progress.55
46 See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that where the
challenged misappropriation relates in part to the broadcasts of the games, the subject mat-
ter requirement is met as to both the broadcasts and the games).
47 See Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1107.
48 See id. at 1108.
49 See id. at 1112 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 605(a) (1994)).
50 See id. at 1113-14.
51 See id. at 1085-115 (concluding that the NBA's misappropriation claim was the only
meritorious claim).
52 See NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d at 841, 848-52 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding "that only a
narrow 'hot news' misappropriation claim survives preemption for actions concerning mate-
rial within the realm of copyright").
53 Id. at 843 ("The crux of the dispute concerns the extent to which a state law 'hot-news'
misappropriation claim based on International News Service v. Associated Press ("INS") sur-
vives preemption by the federal Copyright Act and whether the NBA's claim fits within the
surviving INS-type claims." (citation omitted)).
54 See id. at 843-44 (explaining the pager's capabilities).
55 See id. (finding that the information included the names of the teams, score changes,
and the time remaining in the game).
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2. "Hot-News" Misappropriation Cause of Action
In International News Service v. Associated Press,5 6 the U.S. Su-
preme Court sought to protect transmission of factual informa-
tion.5 7 The Court held that the International News Service's (INS)
use of the Associated Press' wire service bulletins to transmit in-
formation to the former's subscribers constituted a misappropria-
tion of Associated Press property.58 In rejecting the NBA's misap-
propriation claim in Motorola, the Second Circuit ruled that
although legitimate "hot-news" misappropriation claims survive
preemption under federal copyright law, "much of New York mis-
appropriation law after INS goes well beyond 'hot news' claims and
is preempted."59 The court found that
the surviving "hot-news" INS-like claim is limited to cases
where: (i) a plaintiff generates or gathers information at a
cost; (ii) the information is time-sensitive; (iii) a defendant's
use of the information constitutes free riding on the plain-
tiffs efforts; (iv) the defendant is in direct competition with a
product or service offered by the plaintiffs; and (v) the ability
of other parties to free-ride on the efforts of the plaintiff or
others would so reduce the incentive to produce the product
or service that its existence or quality would be substantially
threatened. We conclude that SportsTrax does not meet that
test.60
Since the NBA and Motorola were not yet in direct competition,
the NBA did not satisfy this requirement and consequently, the
sports league could not use the "hot-news" misappropriation claim
to control the dissemination of information concerning games in
progress. 61 Had the NBA been offering a similar service, the Sec-
ond Circuit would have likely sustained the "hot news" misappro-
priation claim.62 This is in accord with the legislative history of the
56 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
57 See International News Serv., 248 U.S. at 239 (recognizing that news gathering services
invest time, money, and effort in acquiring information to be commercially disseminated).
58 See id. at 242 (discerning that International News Service was "sell[ing] complainant's
goods as its own").
59 Motorola, 105 F.3d at 845.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 853-54 (indicating that although the NBA had intentions of marketing a
service similar to SportsTrax, it had yet to do so).
62 Id. at 854 ("To be sure, if [Motorola] in the future were to collect facts from an enhanced
Gamestat pager to retransmit them to SportsTrax pagers, that would constitute free-riding
and might well cause Gamestats to be unprofitable because it had to bear costs to collect
1998]
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Copyright Law, which expressly carves out an exception for "hot
news" misappropriation causes of action.63
In reaching its decision, the Second Circuit held that "where the
challenged copying or misappropriation relates in part to the copy-
righted broadcasts of the games, the subject matter requirement
[for preemption] is met as to both the broadcasts and the games."64
The Motorola holding ignores one of the strongest rationales un-
derlying the misappropriation cases. As stated in a seminal case:
[The parties] are using baseball news as material for profit.
The Athletic Company has, at great expense, acquired and
maintains a baseball park, pays the players who participate
in the game, and have, as we view it, a legitimate right to
capitalize on the news value of their games by selling exclu-
sive broadcasting rights to companies which value them as
affording advertising mediums for their merchandise. 65
In Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 66 the defen-
dant radio station broadcasted "play-by-play descriptions" of home
games played by the Pittsburgh Pirates major league baseball
team, in violation of the team's broadcast licenses with other radio
broadcasters. 67 The defendant used reporters positioned outside of
the ballpark, at locations where they could observe the game. 68 The
court held that the defendant's actions violated the plaintiffs prop-
erty interest in the news value of the games. 69
facts that SportsTrax did not.") Gamestats is service that the NBA was in the process of de-
veloping at the time of the opinion, which provided game information to media within the
basketball arena. See id. at 853. The NBA planned to expand the service to the public at
large in the future. See id.
63 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748. The
legislative history states:
[Sitate law should have the flexibility to afford a remedy (under traditional principles of
equity) against a consistent pattern of unauthorized appropriation by a competitor of
the facts (i.e., not the literary expression) constituting "hot" news, whether in the tradi-
tional mold of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), or in
the newer form of data updates from scientific, business, or financial data bases.
Id. (footnote omitted).
64 Motorola, 105 F.3d at 848; see infra notes 231-39 and accompanying text (discussing the
Federal Copyright Act and examining whether it preempts the right of publicity).
65 Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490, 492 (W.D. Pa. 1938)
(emphasis added).
66 Id.
67 See id. at 491-92.
68 See id. at 492 (noting that the reporters were positioned outside the arena, but were
capable of observing the activity on the playing field).
66 See id. at 494 (finding that defendants' actions constituted unfair competition and vio-
lated the Communications Act of 1934). The court concluded that
What's the Score?
Although Motorola did not broadcast entire games, the service,
similar to the broadcasts in Pittsburgh Athletic, did compete with
the League's "right to capitalize on the news value of [the] games."70
3. The Right of Publicity and "Hot-News" Misappropriation Theory
Distinguished
As mentioned earlier, Prosser dubbed the right of publicity as the"appropriation" prong of the right of privacy.71 In some jurisdic-
tions, therefore, the right of publicity is denominated "commercial
misappropriation."72 The cause of action these terms designate
should be distinguished from the "hot-news" misappropriation
cause of action.7 3 "Hot-news" misappropriation claims focus on a
person's information gathering activities as opposed to that person's
efforts to create a marketable identity.7 4
II. PARAMETERS OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
States generally have taken two approaches in recognizing the
right of publicity-either by enacting a statute to codify the right,
or allowing it to remain the subject of common law protection. This
Part looks at these approaches, beginning with two states that have
substantial right of publicity jurisprudence. Given the degree of
media concentration in New York and California, we will look first
to the approaches taken by these two states.
The defendant wrongfully deprive[d] the plaintiffs and each of them of the just benefits
of their labors and expenditures in respect of the baseball games and the public dis-
semination of news thereof as alleged in the complaint; and the action, threatened ac-
tion and practice of the defendant constitute a fraud on the public.
Id.
70 Id. at 492; see NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 843-44 (explaining the pager's in-
formation capabilities).
71 See Prosser, supra note 28, at 389 (characterizing the tort as "[aippropriation, for the
defendant's advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness").
72 See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1280 (D. Minn. 1970) (examining the
difference between the general sort of invasion of privacy based on misappropriation for
commercial use and misappropriation as a separate tort); Montana v. San Jose Mercury
News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995) (finding that the statutory and the
common law action for misappropriation complement one another).
73 See infra notes 232-40 and accompanying text (discussing the Federal Copyright Act
and the right of publicity).
74 See, e.g., Motorola, 105 F.3d at 852 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing the five requirements un-
der the International News Service "hot-news" standard).
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A. New York's Protection of the Right of Publicity
New York courts have held that no common law cause of action is
available to vindicate the right of publicity in New York, aside from
sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.7 5 As New
York jurisprudence does not recognize a common law right of pub-
licity, we now turn to the question of why the NBA did not bring a
cause of action under New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and
51. These sections forbid the unauthorized use of the name or pic-
ture of a person for commercial purposes and corporations. New
York law provides for equitable relief, damages, and, where appro-
priate, punitive damages.7 6
Although Motorola's use of the NBA's name (or the name of the
individual teams)77 in providing scores and statistics and in mar-
keting the product 78 seems violative of sections 50 (which imposes
criminal penalties for the violation of the right of privacy) and 51
(which provides civil remedies), these statutes explicitly address
the marketable identity of "living persons."79 Furthermore, the
statutes were created "'to protect an individual against "selfish,
commercial exploitation.' ' 80  Thus, corporations are not protected
by sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law.
However, there is a separate section of the New York statutory
code which provides protection for certain categories of not-for-
profit organizations, indicating the New York legislature's willing-
ness to protect some organizations' right of publicity.81 One ques-
tion that arises under section 397 is how to treat a cause of action
brought by a not-for-profit organization such as the National Foot-
75 See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (noting that
protection against the use of a person's picture or portrait for advertising purposes, is en-
compassed under existing statutory provisions, rendering an independent common law right
of publicity unnecessary).
76 See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1998).
77 See NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1076
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that NBA Properties "has the exclusive worldwide rights to market
and promote NBA games and, accordingly, controls and manages [the NBA's] intellectual
property rights"), afftd in part and vacated in part sub nom. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841 (2d Cir. 1997).
78 See infra notes 152-70 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA's efforts at making a
marketable identity).
79 N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1998).
80 Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (emphasis added); see
Dauer & Fittipaldi, Inc., v. Twenty First Century Communications, Inc., 349 N.Y.S.2d 736
(App. Div. 1973) (stating that "it is settled that corporations do not have a legally protected
right of privacy in New York").
81 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 397 (McKinney 1996).
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ball League to recover for an infringement of its right of publicity.8 2
In its list of protected organizations, section 397 neither explicitly
enumerates not-for-profit organizations formed to promote the ad-
vancement of a particular sport, or sports in general, nor explicitly
precludes this type of not-for-profit organization. 83 In fact, section
397 was amended in 1986 to add the words "or to inform or educate
the consumer by publishing and disseminating the results of tests
and evaluations of goods and services," as a result of the Consumers
Union cases, in which both state and federal courts held that the
code section did not cover that organization.8 4
B. California Right of Publicity Protection
Currently, California state law offers the broadest protection for
the right of publicity, both statutorily and at common law.
1. California Statutory Protection
The relevant California Civil Code provision, section 3344, pro-
vides:
Use of another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or like-
ness for advertising or selling or soliciting purposes
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name,
voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner,
on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes
of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, prod-
ucts, merchandise, goods or services, without such per-
son's prior consent, or, in the case of a minor, the prior
consent of his parent or legal guardian, shall be liable for
any damages sustained by the person or persons injured
as a result thereof.
82 Cf. Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1076 (noting that the NFL "is an unincorpo-
rated not-for-profit association comprised of thirty member clubs engaged in the business of
creating, organizing, promoting, and exhibiting professional football games").
83 See N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 397 (McKinney 1996) (listing the organizations protected by
the provision).
84 Id.; see Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 F.2d. 1044,
1054 (2d Cir. 1983); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Remington Prods., Inc., 499
N.Y.S.2d 566 (App. Div. 1986); see also Richard A. Givens, Practice Commentary, in N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw § 397 (McKinney 1996) (supplying background information concerning the
1986 amendment).
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(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice,
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with any
news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for
which consent is required under subdivision (a).
(e) The use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness in a commercial medium shall not constitute a
use for which consent is required under subdivision (a)
solely because the material containing such use is com-
mercially sponsored or contains paid advertising. Rather
it shall be a question of fact whether or not the use of the
person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness
was so directly connected with the commercial sponsor-
ship or with the paid advertising as to constitute a use
for which consent is required under subdivision (a).
(f) Nothing in this section shall apply to the owners or
employees of any medium used for advertising, including,
but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, radio and
television networks and stations, cable television sys-
tems, billboards, and transit ads, by whom any adver-
tisement or solicitation in violation of this section is pub-
lished or disseminated, unless it is established that such
owners or employees had knowledge of the unauthorized
use of the person's name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness as prohibited by this section.85
It appears that, on its face, this code section would apply to
sports leagues, such as the NBA. Unlike some other state statutes,
section 3344 does not explicitly limit its protections to people.8 6 Nor
did the California legislators define the term "person" in the code
section. Looking at section 14 of the California Civil Code may
prove useful in interpreting the language of section 3344.87 When
85 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
86 Compare id., with FLA. STAT. ANN § 540.08 (West 1996 & Supp. 1998) (limiting the
scope of protection to people), NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -204 (1997) (restricting protection
to natural persons), NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.770 (Michie Supp. 1995) (defining "person"
as a natural person), N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1992 & Supp. 1998)
(employing the term "living person"), and TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1102 to -1104 (Supp.
1995) (restricting protection to "individuals" which in turn is defined as a "human being, liv-
ing or dead").87 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 14 (West 1992) (furnishing a definition of natural person which
includes corporations).
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section 14 was originally enacted in 1872, it provided a definition of
persons which included certain organizations:
Where the term "person" is used to designate the party
whose property may be the subject of any offense, action, or
proceeding, it includes this State, any other State, Govern-
ment, or country which may lawfully own any property
within this State, and all public and private corporations, or
joint associations, as well as individuals. The word "person,"
except when used by way of contrast, includes not only hu-
man beings, but bodies politic or corporate.88
Although this section was amended in 1874, the California Code
continues to define the word "person" to include associations and
corporations.89
2. California Common Law
In addition to statutory protection, California courts recognize a
common law right of publicity which provides protection broader
than that of section 3344.90 These courts have held that "[t]he
statutory cause of action complements rather than codifies [the]
common law" right of publicity.91 Furthermore, courts "have con-
strued the statute's protection of name, voice, signature, photo-
graph, or likeness more narrowly than the common law's protection
of identity."92 Kareem Abdul-Jabbar, a former NBA basketball
player, brought claims under the Lanham Act, the California com-
mon law right of publicity, as well as California Civil Code section
3344, alleging that the defendant "violated his trademark and pub-
licity rights by using his former name, Lew Alcindor, [in a commer-
cial for its product] without his consent."93 In deciding this case,
88 CAL. CIV. CODE § 14 note (West 1982) (Historical Note).
89 See id. (indicating that section 14 experienced only one other amendment in 1903).
90 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 414 (9th Cir. 1996)
(describing a broader construction under common law).
91 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995); see
Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414 (explaining that "the statute is best understood as'complementing,' rather than enacting, the common law cause of action, because the two are
not identical").
92 Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
93 Id. at 409; see infra notes 257-63 and accompanying text (describing the commercial
and the context in which "Lew Alcindor" was used).
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the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the right of publicity is firmly
entrenched in California common law.9 4
Although language in the opinion refers to "name and likeness,"
the Ninth Circuit has held that "California's common law 'right of
publicity is not limited to the appropriation of name or likeness.'
The key issue is appropriation of the plaintiffs identity."95 Thus,
any attribute that evokes this identity arguably is covered by Cali-
fornia common law.
To establish a prima facie case of common law right of publicity,
the plaintiff must allege: "(1) the defendant's use of plaintiffs iden-
tity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiffs name or likeness to defen-
dant's advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent;
and (4) resulting injury."96
However, to establish a prima facie case under section 3344(a),
plaintiff must allege two other elements: "(1) knowing use; and (2)
a 'direct connection . . . between the use and the commercial pur-
pose."' 97 In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. ,98 a game
show celebrity brought suit alleging defendants breached both her
common law right of publicity and her rights under section 3344 by
marketing a robot that she claimed evoked her marketable iden-
tity.99 The Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal of the section 3344
claim, but reversed the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs
common law claim. 00 In discussing the common law right of pub-
licity, the Ninth Circuit held that the right protects "means of ap-
propriation other than name or likeness," as well as actual name
and likeness.' 0 ' The Abdul-Jabbar court found that while section
3344 is "limited to commercial appropriations," state common law
may apply in non-commercial contexts as well.102
94 See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 413 (explaining "that the reaction of the public to name
and likeness.., endows the name and likeness of the person involved with commercially ex-
ploitable opportunities").
95 Id. at 414 (quoting White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1992)).
96 Id. at 413-14; see Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.
97 Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414 (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342,
347 (Ct. App. 1983)).
98 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
99 See id. at 1396 (stating that the advertisement in dispute displayed a robot whose ap-
pearance resembled that of the plaintiff, posing on a game show set resembling the set on
which the plaintiff became famous).
100 See id. at 1399 (resolving that the district court had erred in rejecting the plaintiffs
claim on summary judgment).
101 Id. at 1398.
102 Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414.
[Vol. 62
19981 What's the Score?
Thus, if the NBA could establish that it has a marketable iden-
tity, the League could then prove a prima facie cause of action un-
der the California common law right of publicity. This identity in-
cludes, but is not limited to, the NBA's name. 103
However, both the common law right of publicity jurisprudence
and section 3344 recognize a privilege for reporting newsworthy
events. 0 4 The question here is whether the Motorola SportsTrax
service constitutes reports of newsworthy events or, to use the lan-
guage of section 3344, "a sports broadcast or account."10 5 This Arti-
cle concludes that it does not.106
C. Current Status of the Right of Publicity-Other States
1. Common Law States
Several states provide common law right of publicity protection,
including states which were the fora for several of the leading cases
addressing the right of publicity for sports figures. 0 7 These states
include New Jersey, 08 Pennsylvania, 10 9 and, Minnesota. 110 Re-
cently, a federal court in Illinois addressed the issue of state com-
103 See supra notes 31-55 and accompanying text (discussing the suit brought by the NBA
against Motorola).
104 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995)
(explaining the importance of "matters in the public interest" exempt them from liability).
105 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
106 See infra notes 206-27 and accompanying text (concludingthat the Motorola-type use
goes beyond merely providing final game scores).
107 In his leading treatise on the right of publicity and the right of privacy, J. Thomas
McCarthy lists 16 states which he identifies as having recognized the right of publicity at
common law. See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 27, § 6. 1[B]. However, some of the states he lists
have enacted statutes as well. See id. § 6.3[C]. The states he lists that have not enacted
statutes are: Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New
Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania. Cf. id. (supplying a chart of states which currently provide a
statutory right of publicity). Though the preceding list does not include Alabama, a recent
Eleventh Circuit case indicates it also recognizes the right of publicity, although not under
that rubric. See Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443, 1446 (11th Cir. 1998).
108 See, e.g., Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
109 See, e.g., Apple Corps. Ltd. v. Button Master, P.C.P., Inc., No. C1V.A.96-5470, 1998 WL
126935, at *13 (E.D. Pa. March 19, 1998) (discussing the state's common law right of public-
ity); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broad. Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938).
110 See, e.g., Hillerich & Bradsby Co. v. Christian Bros., Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1136, 1141 (D.
Minn. 1996) (discussing Minnesota's common law right of publicity in the context of the li-
censing of athletes' names and images); Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282
(D. Minn. 1970) (noting that the celebrity's identity is "the fruit of his labors and is a type of
property").
Albany Law Review
mon law protection of athletes' right of publicity."' In MJ & Part-
ners Restaurant Limited Partnership v. Zadikoff,112 the court held
that Illinois common law does recognize the tort of misappropria-
tion, although Illinois state courts have not explicitly "addressed
the relationship between the tort of misappropriation and the 'right
of publicity."11 3
In another recent case, Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques,114 the
Eleventh Circuit distinguished the right of publicity from the com-
mon law tort of commercial appropriation right of privacy and held
that Alabama's common law commercial appropriation privacy
right, "represent[ed] the same interests and address[ed] the same
harms as does the right of publicity as customarily defined." 115
"Indeed, the elements of Alabama's commercial appropriation inva-
sion of privacy tort, which bases liability on commercial, rather
than psychological, interests, do not differ significantly from [the
elements] of the tort of violation of the right of publicity."" 6
2. Statutory Provisions
In addition to New York and California, other states have en-
acted statutes to codify the right of privacy." 7
a. State Statutes That Explicitly Limit Protections to Natural
Persons
In 1977, the Wisconsin legislature enacted section 895.50 under
the general caption of "right of privacy."118 One definition of
"invasion of privacy" is included in the provisions of section
895.50(2)(b): "The use, for advertising purposes or for purposes of
111 MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
112 Id.
113 Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 930 (rejecting the argument that the right to publicity does
not exist in Illinois).
114 136 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998).
115 Id. at 1447 ("Although it does not appear that Alabama courts ever have recognized a
right denominated as 'publicity,' we conclude that the Alabama right of privacy contains an
analogous right.").
116 Id. at 1447 (citation omitted).
117 These states include: Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra notes
118-32 and accompanying text.
118 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West 1997).
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trade, of the name, portrait or picture of any living person, without
having first obtained the written consent of the person...."119
Section 540.08 of Florida's statutes also limits the scope of its
protection to "natural person[s]," 120 as does Nebraska, 121 Nevada, 122
and Utah. 23 The Texas statute, which creates a property right
strictly to allow the descendability of the right of privacy, limits
protections to individuals. 124
Although the Kentucky code section does not define "person" as
natural persons, the language of the section which acknowledges
that "the right of publicity.., does not terminate upon death" is a
strong indication that the section is limited to natural persons. 25
The Tennessee code provision restricts its protections to individu-
als, defined as "human being[s], living or dead."126 Although the
Virginia statute does not explicitly restrict its scope to natural per-
sons, the code section's language indicates that the protection is re-
stricted to natural persons. 27
b. State Statutes that Do Not Explicitly Limit Protections to
Natural Persons.
In addition to California,128 there are other states that do not ex-
plicitly restrict right of publicity protection to natural persons.
These states include Indiana, 29 Massachusetts, 13 0 and Rhode Is-
land.1 1 Furthermore, the Oklahoma code section specifically ex-
119 Id.; see Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979) (stating
that the law should provide protection for the advertising value of a celebrity's personality).
120 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.08 (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
121 See NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -204 (1997) (explaining that it is the intention of the
legislature "to give to any natural person a legal remedy in the event of violation of the
right").
122 See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.770 (Michie 1994) (defining terms used in Nevada's
statutory right of publicity).
123 See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -3-6 (1993).
124 See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001 to .015 (West Supp. 1998).
125 Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (Michie 1984).
126 TENN. CODEANN. § 47-25-1102 (1995).
127 Compare VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-40 (Michie Supp. 1992) (allowing suit under this stat-
ute by "any person"), with VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-216.1 (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing that a"person, firm, or corporation" may be found guilty under this provision).
128 See supra notes 86-90 (discussing courts' interpretation of California Code section 3344
to include corporations and associations).
129 See IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-5 (Michie 1995) (defining "person" as "a partnership, a
firm, a corporation, or an unincorporated association").
130 See MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 214, § 3A. (Law. Co-Op. 1986).
131 See R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-1-28.1 (1997) (maintaining that "every person in this state shall
have a right to privacy").
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tends its protections to baseball teams. Section 1449 of the Okla-
homa code reads in pertinent part: "A definable group [eligible for
protection] includes, but is not limited to, the following examples:
A crowd at any sporting event,.., a baseball team."132
III. PROPOSED APPLICATION OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY TO
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES
A. Why Should the Right of Publicity Protect Sports Leagues?
1. Use of NBA's Name
One of the traits that the right of publicity indisputably protects,
both at common law and statutorily, is one's name. 13 3 In Motorola,
the district court found that Motorola used the NBA's name in
marketing SportsTrax, including the term "NBA SportsTrax," as
well as the name of the individual teams, although there was no
evidence that Motorola "ever advertised that NBA manufactured,
licensed, sponsored, or approved of SportsTrax."3 4
2. Use of Marketable Identity
In Motorola, the district court recognized the commercial value of
NBA games and the efforts the League takes to protect and in-
crease this commercial value.135 As to the value of the games, the
court found that NBA games have "vast commercial value and ap-
peal" much of which "is attributable to years of NBA's promotional
investments" and activities. 136 The commercial value of NBA games
132 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1449 (West 1993).
133 See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979) (A right
of publicity "cause of action for appropriation of a person's name ... exist[ed] at common law
in Wisconsin").
134 NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071, 1081-82
(S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d
841 (2d Cir. 1997).
135 See id. at 1077 (describing the NBA's licensing and advertising agreements).
136 Id. The court's findings include, in pertinent part:
.. . The National Broadcasting Company ("NBC"), for example, pays NBA approxi-
mately $3 million per game for the national network television broadcast rights to NBA
games.
... Turner Broadcasting ("Turner") pays NBA approximately $1 million per game for
the rights to televise nationally 115 regular season and playoff games.
... ESPN Radio pays NBA approximately $50,000 to $100,000 per game for the na-
tional radio distribution rights for NBA games.
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in progress accounts for approximately eighty percent of the
League's income, including broadcast license agreements and ticket
sales. 137 Thus, the NBA has an interest in restricting dissemination
of games in progress; as to the League's attempts to restrict the dis-
semination of information about games in progress, the court found
that "[a]lthough [the] NBA relies on... public dissemination of
real-time NBA game data to enhance public interest in NBA games,
it must, in order to preserve the value of its proprietary interest in
this information, impose limitations on its dissemination."138 Thus,
... In addition to these national broadcast agreements, NBA has a series of local and
regional license agreements. In the New York Metroplex, NBA has agreements with
MSG Network and Sports Channel, which carry New York Knicks and New Jersey Nets
games respectively.
Id. (citations omitted).
137 See id. (describing in substantial detail, the efforts taken by the League to protect its
assets).
138 Id. at 1078 (emphasis added). The district court's decision reads, in pertinent part:
• . . Although NBA relies on this public dissemination of real-time NBA game data to
enhance public interest in NBA games, it must, in order to preserve the value of its pro-
prietary interest in this information, impose limitations on its dissemination.
•.. NBA's license agreements represent one limitation.
• . . Another limitation is NBA's media credentials. These media credentials ensure
that entities, despite the legitimacy of their news gathering and dissemination func-
tions, are not able to disseminate real-time information which is comparable to that
provided by NBA's paying licensees without compensating NBA.
... In this manner, NBA balances the goals of informing the public about, and attract-
ing interest in, NBA games, on the one hand, and preserving its ability to derive reve-
nue from the sale of real-time NBA game information, on the other hand.
... Credentialed media entities are admitted to the arenas and are permitted to provide
post-game reports and, to a more limited extent, reports of NBA games while they are in
progress.
... According to NBA's 1995-96 Media Pass: Television and radio stations may use ex-
cerpts of NBA games only in the manner and on the terms and conditions set forth in
the NBA's Video and Audio Highlights Licenses, receipt of which is acknowledged. Any
other use requires prior specific written approval from the NBA. The use of any photo-
graph, film, tape or drawing of the game, player interviews or other arena activities
taken or made by the accredited organization or the individual for whom this credential
has been issued shall be limited to news coverage of the game by the organization to
which this credential is issued unless expressly authorized in writing by the NBA.
Permission to film or tape NBA games may be revoked at any time by the NBA. All
ownership, copyright and property rights in the NBA games, telecast thereof and in the
events and activities conducted in the arena shall remain the sole property of the NBA
and no such rights are conferred or intended to be conferred or created on behalf of any
other person or entity by the issuance of this credential.
• . . NBA's Media Guidelines provide further specifications for photographers, camera-
men, and the electronic media, and they limit the nature of the media's use of video
highlights of NBA games.
... The electronic media restrictions state:
No electronic media personnel shall transmit scores and/or other game information out
of an NBA arena (by telephone or by any other means) more than three times during
each quarter and once during each of the two quarter breaks without the prior specific
written approval of the NBA; provided, however, that in the event that such game in-
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major professional sports leagues have invested, and continue to
invest, great sums of money and time in marketing their games and
in trying to control the nature and timing of the scores and statis-
tics of these games. 13 9 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Co.:
The broadcast of a film of [a performer's] entire act poses a
substantial threat to the economic value of that perform-
ance.... [T]his act is the product of [the performer's] own
talents and energy, the end result of much time, effort, and
expense. Much of its economic value lies in the "right of ex-
clusive control over the publicity given to his performance"; if
the public can see the act free on television, it will be less
willing to pay to see it .... The effect of a public broadcast..
volves one or more "overtime" periods, two additional transmissions per overtime period
(once during the overtime period and once during the break immediately prior to the
start of such overtime period) shall be authorized without the prior written approval of
the NBA; and provided, further, that no such transmission shall exceed thirty seconds
in length. The limitation on transmissions contained in the preceding sentence shall
not be applicable during pre-game, post-game, or half-time of the game.
... The video highlights restrictions provide, inter alia, that game highlights: "may be
used only for news purposes in regularly scheduled news programs up to 72 hours after
the completion of the game," "may not exceed two minutes" for any one NBA game that
has been completed, "may only include Highlights of the first half' of an ongoing NBA
game, and "may not incorporate announcer commentary from game telecasts."
... SportsTicker, which is owned by ESPN, is one of the entities to which NBA has pro-
vided its media credentials. Based on game updates from its representatives in the are-
nas, SportsTicker distributes electronically the score and time remaining three times
per quarter and once at the end of the quarter. It creates a data feed with this informa-
tion and sells the information to its clients.
... NBA does not control SportsTicker's decisions as to who receives its data feeds;
NBA only regulates the frequency and types of information which SportsTicker may
provide.
... One product which uses SportsTicker's data feed is "ESPNET To.Go," a pager device
manufactured by Motorola which distributes sports information about ongoing Major
League Baseball, NFL, NBA, NHL, and Division I NCAA football and basketball games.
.. In addition to the promotional benefits provided by other entities with media cre-
dentials, SportsTicker provides NBA teams with the scores to other NBA games around
the league, which are displayed for fans in each arena.
... For the same reason that NBA restricts the dissemination of real-time information
by media entities, NBA also places restrictions on patrons who view NBA games from
the arenas.
... The back of admission tickets states: "By your use of this ticket.., you agree that
you will not transmit or aid in transmitting any description, account, picture or repro-
duction of the event to which this ticket invites you."
... Further, NBA places signs at the entrances to the arenas and mails publications to
season ticket holders which contain similar restrictions.
Id. at 1078-79 (citations omitted).
139 See id. at 1076-77 (explaining that the National Football League, the Office of the
Commissioner of Baseball, and the National Hockey League all submitted amicus curiae
briefs).
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. is similar to preventing [the performer] from charging an
admission fee. 14°
As much of the return on the NBA's investment in promotional
activities takes the form of revenues, such as broadcast licenses
that are a direct result of the League's restrictions on the dissemi-
nation of information on games in progress, allowing Motorola to
provide real-time updates of basketball games in progress provides
an analogous "threat to the economic value" of those games similar
to the threat that concerned the Zacchini court. 141 Here, the threat
comes not from television broadcasts, but from services such as
SportsTrax. Although the public has a choice between paying to see
the games in person and watching "free" games on television, the
League receives fees from media entities for these broadcasts. 142
Thus, the NBA is compensated for any loss of ticket revenues due to
the decline in attendance at League games, caused by people
choosing to watch the games on television, with broadcast licensing
fees. But the League receives no fees from SportsTrax similar to
the broadcast licensing fees. 143 The question is whether these ef-
forts have created a marketable identity outside that of the individ-
ual athlete. This Article contends that they have.
a. What Is a Marketable Identity?
The concept of marketable identity reflects the ,efforts of athletes
in creating a public image with which consumers desire to associ-
ate.'" This desire is apparent from the interest in using athletes'
identities to market games,"45 restaurants, 46 and other consumer
140 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575-76 (1977) (emphasis added).
141 See id. (describing how the performer is harmed).
142 See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text (discussing broadcast licensing agree-
ments).
143 See Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1084-85 (noting that SportsTrax was con-
cerned that it might have to pay a royalty or face a lawsuit).
144 See, e.g., Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 134 (Wis. 1979) ("'An
advertiser who appropriates an individual's personality .... uses the audience appeal of
[that] personality... to sell goods. Audience appeal is a principal stock-in-trade of a celeb-
rity.").
145 See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (involving the
use of baseball players' names to market a table game); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232
A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (dealing with the use of professional golfers' names
in connection with a board game).
146 See, e.g., MJ & Partners Restaurant Ltd. Partnership v. Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (concerning the unauthorized use of a basketball player's name by a restau-
rant).
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products. 147 Zadikoff illustrates the desire of the public, and deri-
vatively, that of corporate marketers, to associate with an athlete's
identity. Not only was the use of Michael Jordan's name and like-
ness at issue, but the plaintiff also claimed that the defendants, in-
cluding Jordan himself, attempted to trade on other elements of
Jordan's identity in opening a competing restaurant by undertaking
such activities as: attempting to "strategically" locate a restaurant
"to benefit from its proximity to the United Center, home of the
Chicago Bulls" to make it more readily accessible to "the large
number of sports fans that use [the] thoroughfare" to the sporting
arena;148 attempting to locate this new restaurant near another Mi-
chael Jordan project;149 "serving 'Carolina Style Food' to take ad-
vantage of the fact that Jordan is from North Carolina"; 150 and dis-
playing "Jordan's vehicles, many of which bear vanity license plates
... outside the [new] restaurant when Jordan [was] visiting."151
b. How Do the NBA's Efforts Compare to the General Construct of
Marketable Identity?
Sports leagues' efforts to create demand for their sport and re-
lated paraphernalia are analogous to the efforts that individual
athletes expend in creating their marketable identities. 152 As men-
tioned in the earlier discussion of the Motorola case, the time,
money and other resources leagues have expended to create this
demand has been successful. 153 Some of this effort has gone into
promoting the leagues as entities as opposed to focusing on par-
ticular players or teams. 54 The fact that the leagues have created
this interest as opposed to allowing it to happen "naturally" is ir-
relevant. To paraphrase the already quoted language of the Ninth
147 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996)
(automobiles); Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974)
(cigarettes).
148 Zadikoff, 10 F. Supp. 2d at 926.
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 See Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 138 (Wis. 1979) (stating that
"the publicity value of a celebrity's name is built up by the investment of work, time, and
money by the celebrity").
153 See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA's marketable iden-
tity).
154 See, e.g., NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1076-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (detailing the promotion of the NBA), affd in part and vacated in
part sub nom. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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Circuit in Abdul-Jabbar, whether the public's fascination with a
celebrity or athlete's persona is "fortuitous or... managed and
planned," the focus should be on the opportunities created by this
fascination. 155 The question is whether others should be able to
profit from the exploitable opportunities created by the leagues' ef-
forts at the expense of the leagues. As one federal district court
stated: "'a person has the right to enjoy the fruits of his own indus-
try free from unjustified interference." 15 6
In his treatise on publicity and privacy law, one legal scholar dis-
cusses both sides of this type of "unjust enrichment" argument.157
On one hand, sports leagues' successful efforts to create public de-
mand for their sports should arguably come at a cost of having to
provide information to the public by making this information "freely
available for use" as part of the public domain. 158 On the other
hand, the question is not whether this information should be made
available to the public, but who should profit from the public's in-
terest: the creator of the interest or a third party.159 After all, "the
real policy choice is not between rich celebrities and the needy pub-
lic, but between celebrities and corporate advertisers who want to
use the aura of celebrity to help sell products." 160  Although this
language focuses on the use of the right of publicity in advertising,
the Supreme Court in Zacchini" conducted a similar analysis in the
context of news reporting.161
c. How Does the Presence of Broadcast Licenses Affect the NBA's
Marketable Identity?
Sports leagues enter into broadcast distribution licensing agree-
ments to publicize their sports and to disseminate information
about games in progress. 162 For example, the district court in Mo-
155 Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 413 (9th Cir. 1996).
156 Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282 (D. Minn. 1970).
157 See 1 McCARTHY, supra note 27, § 2.1 (detailing the policyreasons for the right of
publicity).
158 Id. § 2.1[A] & n.13 (quoting Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:
Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 136-38 (1993)); see id. § 2.3.
159 Id. § 2.1[A], 2-4.1 ("'[T]he choice is between the individual to whom . . .associative
value attaches and a stranger to the process who would make money out of it."').
160 Id.
161 See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 563, 576 (1977) (concerning the
unauthorized broadcast of petitioner's entire performance on a televised news program).
162 See generally NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1076-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (providing information regarding the NBA's licensing agreements),
aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
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torola set forth a list of findings of fact.163 As previously mentioned,
the court found that eighty percent of the NBA's revenues came
from such agreements. 164 If these leagues were unable to restrict
the dissemination of game statistics while the games were in prog-
ress, the value of these agreements would effectively disappear. As
the district court stated: "Although NBA relies on... public dis-
semination of real-time NBA game data to enhance public interest
in NBA games, it must, in order to preserve the value of its proprie-
tary interest in this information, impose limitations on its dissemi-
nation."165
The presence of broadcast licenses does not affect the NBA's in-
terest in controlling the dissemination of League game scores and
statistical information. 166 Courts have rejected the argument that
the widespread publication of athletes' performance statistics by
news media, or the availability of this data to the public at-large,
destroys the right of publicity.167 As one court has stated: "'It is un-
fair that one should be permitted to commercialize or exploit or
capitalize upon another's name, reputation or accomplishments
merely because the owner's accomplishments have been highly
publicized."168
In Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises,69 the court rejected the ar-
gument that the use of athletes' biographical data is not privileged
in all circumstances merely because the information had been pre-
viously published. 70
163 See id. at 1076; see also supra note 138 (reproducing relevant portions of the court's
findings).
164 See id. at 1077 (indicating that broadcast licenses and admission fees were among the
sources of the NBA's revenue).
165 Id. at 1078; see supra note 138 (discussing the court's findings of fact).
166 See Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1078 (stating that broadcast licenses are
one way the NBA limits score dissemination).
167 See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279-82 (D. Minn. 1970)
(rejecting defendants' claim that statistics published regularly in the media become part of
the public domain).
168 Id. at 1282.
169 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
170 See id. at 460-62 (explaining that an individual should be able to enjoy his hard work
without it being capitalized on by others).
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3. Courts Have Applied the Right of Publicity to Professional
Athletes
One of the first cases to discuss an athlete's right of publicity was
Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc.171 Since then,
courts have decided several cases involving this particular topic, as
illustrated by the cases cited in this Article. The Seventh Circuit,
in Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n,172
recognized that athletes have the right, in some instances, to con-
trol the commercial use of their identities. 173 However, the court
held that teams, as copyright owners of game telecasts, controlled
the players' rights of publicity as to televised game performances,
and not the players themselves. 174 In Baltimore Orioles, the Major
League Players Association sought a declaratory judgment to de-
termine whether the players or the teams for which they played
owned "the broadcast rights to the Players' performances during
major league baseball games."175
4. Courts Have Applied the Right of Publicity to Teams
In Shamsky v. Garan, Inc. ,176 the New York Supreme Court held
that t-shirts bearing a team picture of the 1969 World Champion
New York Mets violated the right of publicity of the individuals por-
trayed in the picture. 177 Although the defendant manufacturer did
not get plaintiffs' approval for the shirt, it used the photograph"under authority from the National Baseball Hall of Fame." 7 8
While acknowledging that "[u]nder New York law, [individual]
players have the right to commercial exploitation of their individual
identities," the Shamsky court rejected the defendant's argument
171 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953); see supra notes 26-30 (discussing the development of right
of publicity case law).
172 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
173 See id. at 679 (stating that the Players may bargain "with the Clubs for a contractual
declaration that the Players own a joint or an exclusive interest in the copyright of the tele-
casts"); infra note 231 and accompanying text (discussing players' rights of publicity other
than in game broadcasts).
174 See id. at 673-74 (noting that an agreement altering the "statutory presumption that
the employer owns the copyright in a work made for hire" must be express).
175 Id. at 665.
176 632 N.Y.S.2d 930 (Sup. Ct. 1995).
177 See id. at 931 (describing the subject photograph as it appeared on the front of the
shirt with random drawings and statistics, including statistics from the 1969 baseball sea-
son, displayed on various areas of the shirt).
178 Id. at 932.
1998] 605
Albany Law Review
that the players relinquished certain publicity rights by entering
into an agreement with the Mets ballclub, and ruled that "each
player retains the right to the commercial exploitation of his iden-
tity," with respect to the photograph in question. 179 The court dis-
tinguished the right of publicity with respect to game performance,
such as represented in the subject photograph, with the right of
publicity in general. 8 0 In doing so, the court acknowledged that in-
dividual players retained their general right of publicity.'8 ' Under
paragraph 3(c) of the player's agreement, the players only assigned
the right to use pictures from games for publicity purposes.182
Thus, the agreement did not grant the team the right to use these
pictures for other (advertising) purposes.
Major league baseball players are not the only athletes in profes-
sional sports who have entered into contracts with teams or leagues
that partially restrict their ability to control their rights of public-
ity. Paragraph 8 of the National Hockey League (NHL) Standard
Player's Contract provides, in pertinent part:
The Club recognizes that the Player owns exclusive rights to
his individual personality, including his likeness.... The
Player hereby irrevocably grants to the Club during the pe-
riod of this Contract and during any period when he is obli-
gated under this Contract to enter into a further contract
with the Club the right to permit or authorize any firm, per-
son or corporation to take and make use of any still photo-
graphs, motion pictures, or electronic (including television)
images of himself in uniform and agrees that thereafter all
rights in such photographs, pictures and images (including
the right to identify him by name) shall belong to the Club
exclusively for the purposes of telecasts, film or video docu-
mentaries or features, advertisements and promotions of the
179 Id. at 933-34. In Shamsky, -the agreement between players and the Mets ballclub
called the "Uniform Players Contract" contained the following provision:
The Player agrees that his picture may be taken for still photographs, motion pictures
or television at such times as the Club may designate and agrees that all rights in such
pictures shall belong to the Club and may be used by the Club for publicity pur-
poses ....
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
180 See id. at 936-37 (explaining that it was upholding the right to "[p]rotection of a per-
sonality with 'marketable status').
181 See id. at 933 (upholding this right despite the possibility of a decrease in commercial
value).
182 See id. at 934 (distinguishing the use of a player's photograph on clothing from a pub-
licity purpose).
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Club's games, use by the media for reportorial purposes,
game programs, yearbooks, magazines and the like, and
purposes in which the focus is on the Club or game and not
the individual Player.183
Paragraph 4 of the National Football League Player Contract
provides, in pertinent part:
Player grants to Club and the League, separately and to-
gether, the authority to use his, name and picture for public-
ity and promotion of NFL Football, the League or any of its
member clubs in newspapers, magazines, motion pictures,
game programs and roster manuals, broadcasts and tele-
casts, and all other publicity and advertising media, pro-
vided such publicity and promotion does not constitute an
endorsement by Player of a commercial product. 18 4
Paragraph 18 of the National Basketball Association Uniform
Player Contract provides in pertinent part:
(a) The Player agrees to allow the Club or the Association to
take pictures of the Player, alone or together with others, for
still photographs, motion pictures or television, at such
times as the Club or the Association may designate, and...
[these pictures] may be used in any manner desired by ei-
ther of them for publicity or promotional purposes. The
rights in any such pictures taken by the Club or by the Asso-
ciation shall belong to the Club or to the Association, as their
interests may appear. 85
With the exception of the NHL players, as part of the above agree-
ments, the athletes also agree to limit their personal appearances
during the sports season and/or to seek the approval of their respec-
tive teams. 186
The Shamsky court, adopting the position advanced by the defen-
dant clothing manufacturer that the clothing "commemorat[es] the
1969 World Champion New York Mets team as a separate and his-
torically recognizable entity," held that, not only was the team being
183 NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE, NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE STANDARD PLAYER'S CON-
TRACT, reprinted in 1 AARON N. WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND
BUSINESS 405 (1997).
184 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYER CONTRACT, re-
printed in 1 WISE & MEYER, supra note 183, at 426.
185 NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION UNIFORM
PLAYER CONTRACT, reprinted in 1 WISE & MEYER, supra note 183, at 462.
186 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (quoting the language of the agree-
ments).
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"commemorated, [but also] that the whole is greater than the sum
of its parts."18 7 Thus, the value of a team's marketable identity as a
team, for example, may be greater than the value of the sum of the
individual team members' marketable identities.
B. Why Should the Right of Publicity Not Protect Sports Leagues?
1. Organization Protection Separate from the Players' Rights
As stated earlier, professional sports teams control the individual
athletes' right of publicity in game performances. 18 8 By agreement,
sports leagues can enforce these rights, although the players other-
wise retain their right of publicity.18 9 However, the question re-
mains whether organizations have a marketable identity, separate
from the rights of their constituents, that courts will protect. The
right of publicity initially grew out of the right of privacy; that is, a
natural person's interest in keeping certain facts private.190 Pro-
tecting the interests of organizations represents an expansion on
the original purpose of the right.'9 ' Recently a court summarily
concluded that corporations do not have a right of publicity. 92
2. Role of Players Associations in Protecting Individual Players'
Rights
Professional athletes, such as major league baseball players, have
formed associations to represent the common interests of players. 193
These associations not only act as labor unions, but also assist their
members in using their rights of publicity.194 The Association of
187 Shamsky, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 933 (first alteration in original) (emphasis added).
188 See supra notes 174-82 (discussing Baltimore Orioles and Shamsky).
189 See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing standard player contracts).
190 See Haelan Lab., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(explaining that "in addition to and independent of [the] right of privacy.., a man has a
right in the publicity value of his photograph"); see also Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc.,
280 N.W.2d 129, 132-37 (Wis. 1979) (discussing the development of the right of publicity in
Wisconsin).
191 See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 4.8[A]-[D] (explaining the idea of expanding the
right of publicity and stating his reasons why this step should not be taken).
192 See Bear Foot Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
193 See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1278 (D. Minn. 1970) (explaining that
the role of the Major League Baseball Players Assocation is "to represent the major league
baseball players' common interest and ... act for [member players] in marketing and licens-
ing the use of group names or for group endorsement purposes").
194 See 1 WISE & MEYER, supra note 183, at 89-98 (discussing the role of unions in the
sports context).
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Major League Baseball Players ("Association") is typical of such an
organization. Not only does the Association act as the exclusive
collective bargaining agent for all active major league baseball
players, it also operates as a group licensing program in which it
acts as the assignee of the individual publicity rights of all play-
ers.195 A relatively recent Tenth Circuit case briefly discussed the
Association's responsibilities concerning licensing agreements:
Since 1966, [the Association] has entered into group licens-
ing agreements for a variety of products, such as candy bars,
cookies, cereals, and, most importantly, baseball trading
cards, which generate over seventy percent of its licensing
revenue. [The Association] receives royalties from these
sales and distributes the money to individual players. 196
At the time of the Uhlaender case, "[t]he Association .. .repre-
sent[ed] over 850 major league baseball players and . . .ha[d] is-
sued some 27 different licensing contracts" on behalf of these play-
ers.197 The Association joined the named individual plaintiff to sue
a board game manufacturer who engaged in the unauthorized use
of the players' marketable identities, including the players' names
and statistics.198
The Association has initiated and defended lawsuits to establish
its members rights. In Baltimore Orioles, the Association tried, al-
beit unsuccessfully, to protect Major League Player's rights in the
broadcasts of their game performances. 199
3. Privatization of Public Facts
Courts and legal scholars have asserted that the right of publicity
gives individuals the power to control the dissemination of public
facts and ideas.200 The Tenth Circuit, in Cardtoons L.C. v. Major
195 See Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1279 (describing in detail the Association's role in li-
censing contracts).
196 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 963 (10th Cir.
1996).
197 Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1279.
198 See id. at 1278 (recognizing that the use of players' names and statistical information
helped attract consumers).
199 See supra notes 172-75 and accompanying text (discussing Baltimore Orioles).
200 See generally Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 975 (stating that this power includes the "power to
suppress criticism"); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture
and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 125, 136-38 (1993) (discussing the debate between"proponents of the right of publicity" and those who argue against it).
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League Baseball Players Ass'n,201 addressed this concern when it
weighed the athletes' right of publicity against the parodists first
amendment rights and found the latter outweighed the former. The
court reasoned that "[t]he potential for suppression [of free expres-
sion] is even greater in the context of publicity rights because the
product involved is the celebrity's own persona."202
The concerns of the right of publicity critics touch on not only the
conflicts between the right and First Amendment freedoms, 20 3 but
also on who "owns" information that may be of interest to the pub-
lic. 204
C. Do Sports Leagues Have a Protectible Right of Publicity?
Except in those states that limit the right of publicity to natural
persons, sports leagues meet the requirements to establish a prima
facie right of publicity. Not only do they have a name that has
achieved some level of public knowledge (which sounds in and may
be separately protected by trademark or Lanham Act provisions),
but these leagues also have created a marketable identity outside of
the combined identities of individual players. 205 Campaigns such as
the NBA's "I Love This Game," have created a commercial interest
in League games in general.
1. Freedom of the Press Concerns
Courts have recognized that "newsworthy" events are privileged
under the right of publicity. The California Court of Appeal has
stated this privilege succinctly:
[N]o cause of action will lie for the "[p]ublication of matters
in the public interest, which rests on the right of the public
to know and the freedom of the press to tell it.. . ." Fur-
201 See Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970-71, 976 (explaining that in this case "[t]he justifications
for the right of publicity are not nearly as compelling as those offered for other forms of in-
tellectual property, and are particularly unpersuasive in the case of celebrity parodies");
Keith Aoki, Authors, Inventors and Trademark Owners: Private Intellectual Property and the
Public Domain, 18 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1 (1993) (discussing the tension between intel-
lectual property and the public dissemination of ideas).
202 Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 972.
203 See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 27, § 2.1[C] (discussing the speech criticism of
the right of publicity).
204 See generally Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 970-76 (weighing the right of publicity against
First Amendment rights).
205 See supra notes 136-43, 162-64 and accompanying text (discussing the NBA's efforts at
creating a marketable identity).
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thermore, a matter in the public interest is not restricted to
current events but may extend to the reproduction of past
events.20 6
In Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. ,207 the plaintiff, a
National Football League quarterback, brought suit challenging a
newspaper's sale of posters reprinting the newspaper articles which
contained Super Bowl coverage. 208 The court held that the defen-
dant newspaper did not use Montana's "face and name solely to ex-
tract the commercial value from them."20 9
Several states have codified this privilege. 210 For example, sec-
tion 3344(d) of the California Civil Code explicitly carves out this
exception. The section provides that "a use of a name, voice, signa-
ture, photograph, or likeness in connection with any news, public
affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or any political campaign,
shall not constitute a use for which consent is required under sub-
division (a)."211
The Ninth Circuit, in Abdul-Jabbar, rejected the defendant's ar-
gument that plaintiffs college record constituted a newsworthy
event and therefore its use was privileged. Instead, the Abdul-
Jabbar court held that section 3344(d) did not apply because the de-
fendant "used the information in the context of an automobile ad-
vertisement, not in a news or sports account."212
However, this privilege does not provide blanket coverage. In
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co. ,213 the Supreme
Court upheld an entertainer's right of publicity to prevent unau-
thorized broadcast of his act, even though the broadcaster asserted
a First Amendment defense. The Court held that the right of pub-
licity to compensate a performer for the time and effort invested in
an act outweighed the broadcaster's First Amendment rights.21 4 In
Zacchini, a television reporter taped a circus performer's 15-second
206 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40.Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 640 (Ct. App. 1995)
(citation omitted).
207 Id.
208 See id. at 641.
209 Id.; see Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (finding that
the use of plaintiff's picture to sell magazine subscriptions was privileged).210 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 540.08(3)(a), 540.10 (West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-
202(1) (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-1107 (1995).
211 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(d) (West 1997).
212 Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407, 416 (9th Cir. 1996).
213 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
214 See id. at 575 (explaining the holding of the case).
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act without the performer's consent. 215 Later, this tape was broad-
cast in its entirety during a television station's news program.216
Thus, viewers of the news program saw the performer's entire
act.217 The performer brought suit alleging that, in broadcasting his
performance without his consent, the television station's conduct
constituted "an unlawful appropriation of [his] professional prop-
erty."218 The Court agreed.219
One of the questions to be considered is what constitutes a news-
worthy event. The Montana court likens a "newsworthy" event to
one that is in the "public interest."220 However, the parties in Mon-
tana did not dispute that the original news stories were in the pub-
lic interest; the question was whether the posters reprinted from
the articles were also considered newsworthy. 22' The court found
that the posters were in fact privileged.222
The U.S. Supreme Court in Zacchini acknowledged that "[t]here
is no doubt that entertainment, as well as news, enjoys First
Amendment protection. It is also true that entertainment can itself
be important news."223 Even so, the Zacchini Court, in weighing
the conflict between the right of publicity and the freedom of the
press, further stated:
The Constitution no more prevents a State from requiring [a
television station] to compensate [a performer] for broad-
casting his act on television than it would privilege [the tele-
vision station] to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic
work without liability to the copyright owner, or to film and
broadcast a prize fight; or a baseball game, where the pro-
moters or the participants had other plans for publicizing
the event.224
215 See id. at 564 (explaining the "film clip, approximately 15 seconds in length, was
shown on the 11 o'clock news program that night, together with favorable commentary").
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 Id. at 564.
219 See id. (noting that the court granted plaintiffs motion for summary judgment).
220 Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639, 641 (Ct. App. 1995)
("When Joe Montana led his team to four Super Bowl championships in a single decade, it
was clearly a newsworthy event .... [a] 'form of public interest presentation .... '").
221 See id. (noting that appellant's argument was based on the First Amendment).
222 Id. (holding that the First Amendment protects the rights in the posters as well); see
Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 363 N.Y.S.2d 276, 277 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (concerning the use of
originally newsworthy photographs reprinted in advertisements).
223 Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 578.
224 Id. at 575 (citations omitted).
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Although a Motorola-type use may not rise to the level of broad-
casting an entire game, it clearly goes beyond merely providing fi-
nal game scores. It still provides an alternative to (1) attending the
game in person at an arena, and (2) watching a live broadcast of the
game, both of which would provide the League with revenue. As
stated earlier, the League receives no revenue from the pager up-
date service. 225 Even if courts find that pager services constitute
valid sports accounts, in situations where the "newsworthy event"
is referred to in a more clear-cut commercial or trade situation,
such as in an advertisement, the privilege does not attach. For ex-
ample, had Motorola more heavily advertised its ability to provide
updates of NBA games in progress during commercials for the
pager, the privilege would not protect Motorola. Furthermore,
some courts have found the motive for profit irrelevant to whether
the use of a publication is privileged. 226
"'The First Amendment is not limited to those who publish with-
out charge. Whether the activity involves newspaper publication or
motion picture production, it does not lose its constitutional protec-
tion because it is undertaken for profit.'" 227
However, courts tend to provide commercial speech with a less
strict review than other forms of speech. 228
2. Preemption by Federal Copyright Act
The Second Circuit in NBA v. Motorola held that sporting events
are not copyrightable. 229 The court stated that
Although the broadcasts are protected under copyright law,
the district court correctly held that Motorola and STATS
did not infringe NBA's copyright because they reproduced
only facts from the broadcasts, not the expression or descrip-
tion of the game that constitutes the broadcast. The
225 See supra note 143 and accompanying text (discussing SportsTrax's unwillingness to
pay a fee).226 See Davis v. High Soc'y Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313 (App. Div. 1982)
(asserting that the use of a name or picture by the media is protected by the First Amend-
ment irrespective of the fact that such publications are carried on largely to make a profit).
227 Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 643 n.2 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods.,
603 P.2d 454 (Cal. 1979)).
228 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 498 (1996) (invalidating a state
statute which purported to ban advertising of liquor prices which was deemed to be commer-
cial speech and therefore required special review).
229 NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841, 846 ("In our view, the underlying basketball
games do not fall within the subject matter of federal copyright protection because they do
not constitute 'original works of authorship' under 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).").
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"fact/expression dichotomy" is a bedrock principle of copy-
right law that "limits severely the scope of protection in
fact-based works."280
Even though the telecasts of sporting events are copyrightable,
and therefore, the players' rights of publicity with respect to tele-
casted game performances are preempted by federal copyright law,
the holding of at least one court seems to indicate that this would
not preempt the players' rights of publicity in any other context.
The Seventh Circuit in the Baltimore Orioles case stated:
The Players' rights of publicity ... are preempted only if
they would be violated by the exercise of the Clubs' copyright
in the telecasts. A player's right of publicity ... would not
be preempted if a company, without the consent of the
player, used the player's name to advertise its product,
placed the player's photograph on a baseball trading card, or
marketed a game based on the player's career statistics.231
Since the right of publicity would rest either with the players or
their teams, it is arguable that, under league agreements, leagues
could pursue cases to protect their right. As with a hot-news mis-
appropriation claim, the question is whether federal copyright law
preempts such a right.
Federal copyright law preempts state law causes of action when
the right sought to be protected by state law is "equivalent to copy-
right."23 2 In other words:
[One which is infringed by the mere act of reproduction,
performance, distribution or display .... If under state law
the act of reproduction, performance[,] distribution or dis-
play... will in itself infringe the state created right, then
such right is preempted. But if other elements are required,
in addition to or instead of, the acts of reproduction, per-
formance, distribution or display, in order to constitute a
state created cause of action, then the right does not lie
230 Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847 (quoting Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499
U.S. 340, 350 (1991)). "[N]o author may copyright facts or ideas. The copyright is limited to
those aspects of the work-termed 'expression'--that display the stamp of the author's origi-
nality." Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985) (citation
omitted).
231 Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 676 n.24
(7th Cir. 1986) (citations omitted).
232 Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 935 (Sup. Ct. 1995) (citing Mayer v. Josiah
Wedgwood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F. Supp. 1523, 1535 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
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"within the general scope of copyright," and there is no pre-
emption. 233
The Shamsky court found the right of publicity constituted such
an extra element. 23 4 The court stated that, "a right to publicity-to
the commercial exploitation of one's identity-appears qualitatively
different from copyright."23 5 The legislative history of the Federal
Copyright Act as it addressed preemption, in 17 U.S.C. § 301, sup-
ports the position that the framers did not intend for copyright law
to necessarily preempt state rights of publicity. The relevant House
Report provides in part: "[C]ommon law rights of 'privacy' [and]'publicity'... would remain unaffected as long as the causes of ac-
tion contain elements, such as an invasion of personal rights...
that are different in kind from copyright infringement."236
The Shamsky court distinguished between the "right of publicity
'in a [particular] performance' [and] . . . a right to commercial ex-
ploitation of one's own identity."M7 In looking at the question of
copyright protection and preemption in light of section 3(c), of the
Major League Players Agreement, 238 the Baltimore Orioles court
found that "a player's 'right of publicity in his name or likeness
would not be preempted' if the club, without consent, commercially
exploited the player's identity."23 9
With respect to the NBA's lawsuit against Motorola, it appears
that sports leagues cannot bring a "hot-news" misappropriation
claim unless they provide services that directly disseminate game
statistics and scores.24° Thus, this exception to federal preemption
is not available to sports leagues.
3. Trademark Protection Under the Lanham Act
To the extent that these names are either registered or unregis-
tered trademarks, the Lanham Act provides a federal cause of ac-
233 Id. (alteration in original).
234 See id.
235 Id.
236 H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 132 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5748.
237 Shamsky, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (quoting Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676 n.24) (first
alteration in original).
238 See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text (discussing the court's finding that
teams control the players' right of publicity as to televised game performances).
239 Shamsky, 632 N.Y.S.2d at 936 (quoting Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676 n.24).
240 See supra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (examining the New York treatment of
the "hot news" misappropriation theory).
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tion for false endorsement claims. 241 However, in general, courts
have not restricted plaintiffs to bringing either a right of publicity
or a Lanham Act cause of action.' 2
The Lanham Act proscribes the commercial use of "any word,
term, name, symbol, or device" where such use would likely cause
consumers to erroneously believe that the person who is identified
by the word, term, name, symbol or device in question is affiliated
with the user's product or service. 243 As the Ninth Circuit stated in
Abdul-Jabbar:
"[A]n express purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect com-
mercial parties against unfair competition."... "Section
43(a)... expressly prohibits, inter alia, the use of any sym-
bol or device which is likely to deceive consumers as to the
association, sponsorship, or approval of goods or services by
another person." . . . [Thus] "[a] false endorsement claim
based on the unauthorized use of a celebrity's identity ...
[which] alleges the misuse of a trademark, i.e., a symbol or
device such as a visual likeness, vocal imitation, or other
uniquely distinguishing characteristic, which is likely to con-
fuse consumers as to the plaintiffs sponsorship or approval
of the product."24
However, in Motorola, the Second Circuit found that, although
Motorola made inaccurate statements in a press release concerning
how SportsTrax gathered game scores and statistics, these mis-
statements did not rise to the level of materiality required under
the Lanham Act.245 Similar to its findings concerning the NBA's
"hot-news" misappropriation claim, the court reached this conclu-
sion due to the lack of direct competition between Motorola and the
NBA in disseminating game statistics and scores. 246
241 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1994) (proscribing false designations of origin and false de-
scriptions).
242 For example, it is commonplace for plaintiffs to assert both right of publicity and Lan-
ham Act causes of action. See, e.g., NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); Ab-
dul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); White v. Samsung Elecs.
Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992).
243 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1994) (proscribing the use of symbols or words, misleading or con-
fusing as to their origin or sponsorship, and misrepresentations in commercial advertising).
244 See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 410 (citations omitted).
245 See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 855.
246 Id. (noting that "if the NBA were in the future to market a rival pager with a direct
datafeed from the arenas... then Motorola's statements regarding source might well be ma-
terially misleading").
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D. Even if Sports Leagues Have a Right of Publicity, Does it Protect
Sports Scores or Statistics?
1. Do Game Statistics and Scores Evoke the NBA's Marketable
Identity?
The argument that Motorola does not violate the right of publicity
in disseminating statistical data on sporting events, because the
right protects the image and identity of celebrities, is open to disa-
greement in light of right of publicity jurisprudence. 247 Courts have
recognized that the unauthorized use of statistical information con-
cerning athletes' careers violates their right of publicity, even
though this information is available to the public from other
sources. 248 For example, under California law, anything that
evokes the commercial persona of the celebrity may be protected
under the right of publicity.249 In White, Vanna White won a judg-
ment against Samsung for using a robot which merely evoked her
commercial persona by having blond hair, a gown and jewelry, and
by standing in front of a gameboard.2 0 In Motschenbacher v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co.,251 the Ninth Circuit held that a race car's
distinctive appearance invoked the marketable identity of its well-
known driver. The defendant's advertisement used a photograph
containing plaintiffs race car.252 Although several of the car's at-
tributes were altered in the picture, the car's most distinctive fea-
tures remained unchanged. 253 The changes were too subtle to pre-
vent individuals from identifying the plaintiff as the owner of the
car in the advertisement. 254
247 See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 407; White, 971 F.2d at 1395.
248 See Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970); Palmer v. Schonhorn
Enters., 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Sup. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967); infra notes 263-75 and accompanying
text (discussing these cases in the context of use of the name and statistics of professional
leagues as violation of the players' right of publicity).
249 See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 414 (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1971)).
250 See White, 971 F.2d at 1399; see also supra notes 98-101 (discussing the case in greater
detail).
251 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
252 See id. at 822.
253 See id.
254 See id.
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The Ninth Circuit in Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.215
held that the unauthorized use of an athlete's former name and sta-
tistics from his career infringed upon his common law right of pub-
licity.25 6 In Abdul-Jabbar, the plaintiff alleged that a television
commercial aired during the 1993 National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation men's basketball tournament violated his trademark and
publicity rights.2 57 During this particular commercial, a disembod-
ied voice asks, "'Who holds the record for being voted the most out-
standing player of the tournament?' In the screen appear the
printed words, 'Lew Alcindor, UCLA, '67, '68, '69.'258 The commer-
cial then continues by giving information about the performance of
the defendant's product.25 9 The Ninth Circuit found that this com-
mercial violated Kareem Abdul-Jabbar's 260 right of publicity, re-
jecting the defendant's argument that Abdul-Jabbar's record was
newsworthy and thus its inclusion in the commercial was privi-
leged. 261 The court stated that, "[w]hile [Abdul-Jabbar's] record
may be said to be 'newsworthy,' its use is not automatically privi-
leged."262 The court further stated that
"It is not important how the defendant has appropriated the
plaintiff's identity, but whether the defendant has done
so .... A rule which says that the right of publicity can be
infringed only through the use of nine different methods of
appropriating identity merely challenges the clever adver-
tising strategist to come up with the tenth."263
In Palmer, several professional golfers, including Arnold Palmer,
brought suit to enjoin the unauthorized use of their names and
so-called "profiles."264 These sheets contained information con-
cerning the golfers professional careers and were used by defendant
255 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996); see supra notes 247-48 (discussing the violation of the right
of publicity by use of statistical information on games even though such information was
available to the public from other sources).
256 See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 415.
257 See id. at 409.
258 Id.
259 See id. (including the ratings and price of the product).
260 See Jabbar to Jabbar: 'Use Another Name!', L.A. SENTINEL, Nov. 19, 1997, at A3
(indicating that Lew Alcindor changed his name to Kareem Abdul-Jabbar after converting to
the Islamic faith).
261 See Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 416; see also supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text
(discussing the privilege under CAL. Civ. CODE § 3344(d) (West 1971)).
262 Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 416.
263 Id. at 414 (quoting White v. Samsung Elec. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir.
1992)).
264 Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., 232 A.2d 458, 459 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
[Vol. 62
What's the Score?
as a component of its "Pro-Am Golf Game."265 The New Jersey
court determined that defendants' use of the plaintiffs' career sta-
tistics enhanced the marketability of their product. 266 In holding
that this use violated the golfers' right of publicity, the court re-
jected defendant's argument that "since the information contained
in the profiles is readily obtainable public data and available to all,
it should not be denied the privilege of reproducing that which is
set forth in newspapers, magazine articles and other periodicals."26 7
The court concluded that the fact that such information, which con-
stituted the plaintiffs' marketable identities, was voluntarily dis-
closed through various news media did not negate the golfers' pro-
prietary interests in their names and statistics and the commercial
use of these features.268
Citing the Palmer case with approval, the court in Uhlaender v.
Henricksen269 found that a similar use of the names and statistics of
professional major league baseball players violated these players'
right of publicity.270 In Uhlaender, several hundred major league
baseball players brought suit to enjoin game manufacturers from
using the players' identifying data in board games.271 The games
used "the names and professional statistical information such as
batting, fielding, earned run and other averages of some 500 to 700
major league baseball players, identified by team, uniform number,
and playing position."272 The court rejected all of the defendants'
arguments, including: (1) that the statistics were readily accessible
to members of the public and were widely published by the news
media; and (2) that the ballplayers sought publicity and the inclu-
sion of the their names and statistics in the board games increased
the publicity given to these players.278 The Uhlaender court, after
discussing the historic development of the right of publicity, and
finding that the plaintiffs had such a right, framed the issue before
it as "whether the plaintiffs' names and published statistics can be
considered property subject to legal protection from unauthorized
265 Id.
266 See id. (discussing the substance of defendants' admissions).
267 Id. at 460.
268 See id. at 462 (noting that while the publication of biographical information "does not
per se constitute an invasion of privacy," the commercial use of such does).
269 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
270 See id. at 1281 (observing that "a celebrity's property interest in his name and likeness
is unique").
271 See id. at 1278.
272 Id.
273 See id. at 1279.
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use."274 The court found that the players' statistics were part of
their marketable identities and thus, their use in the subject board
games violated the players' right of publicity.275
What sports leagues would be seeking to protect in evolving a
right of publicity is the totality of the leagues games and sched-
ules.276
2. Does Motorola-Type Dissemination of Real-Time Scores Fall
Under an Exception for News or Sports Accounts?
As previously discussed, courts and legislatures have created an
exception to the right of publicity. 277 This exception allows for the
use of biographical information, including career statistics, in news
and sports accounts, as well as incidental reprinting of such ac-
counts to promote the media outlet.278 Both the district court and
the Second Circuit in the Motorola case treat the pager service's
score dissemination as a news or sports account, without distin-
guishing this type of dissemination from a typical news or sports
account. 279 Even if one assumes that Motorola-type dissemination
constitutes a news or sports account, a Zacchini analysis would
seem to require that this type of dissemination should not be privi-
leged in light of the negative impact it may have on sports leagues'
revenue derived from controlling access to games in progress. 280
This position is also supported by the rationale set out in Pittsburgh
Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co.,281 in preventing a radio sta-
tion from play-by-play descriptions of games by reporters situated
274 Id. at 1281 (emphasis added).
275 See id. at 1283.
276 See generally NBA v. Sports Team Analysis and Tracking Sys., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1071,
1088 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), affd in part and vacated in part sub nom. NBA v. Motorola, Inc., 105
F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
277 See supra notes 211-27 and accompanying text (discussing the news reporting privilege
in different states and specifically under CAL. CiV. CODE § 3344 (West 1971)).
278 See id.
279 See Motorola, 105 F.3d at 847 (determining that Motorola merely produced facts from
the broadcast); Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1094 (explaining that the service"provide[s] purely factual information which any patron of an NBA game could acquire from
the arena").
280 See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text (discussing Zacchini restrictions on
freedom of press privilege).
281 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938); see supra notes 56-74 and accompanying text
(discussing the hot-news misappropriation cause of action).
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outside of the stadium, in positions from which they could observe
the action.28 2
CONCLUSION
In the decades since courts first recognized the right of publicity,
the right has been used to protect several aspects of one's market-
able identity. It has expanded beyond protecting only name and
likeness, and now protects voice, certain performances, biographical
facts, and symbolic representations. The right has gone from pro-
tecting individual celebrities to groups of celebrities. At least one
state legislature has expanded by statute the right of publicity to
not-for-profit organizations. Therefore, finding that other organiza-
tions have a right of publicity, independent of the right of publicity
of the organization's constituents, does not represent a significant
expansion from the current state of the right of publicity. Granted,
the right of publicity is vastly different that it was forty-five years
ago, but so are the methods that can be used to invade the interests
the right seeks to protect. Recognizing that sports leagues have a
right of publicity would allow them to protect interests not other-
wise protected by the Copyright Act, Lanham Act false advertising
provisions, or other state and common law unfair competition pro-
tections. As mentioned in the preceding section, the district court
in Motorola recognized that the NBA was trying to
protect [not just] a written book of NBA rules or coaches'
plays or a tangible recording of an NBA game. Instead, it
[sought] to protect the NBA games themselves-the culmi-
nation of interaction of these NBA rules and coaches' plays,
the referees, the players, and perhaps even the announcers,
members of the press, vendors, patrons, security guards,
ticket takers, and the like who are present at the arena
during an NBA game and whose interaction comprises an
NBA game.283
If we accept that organizations such as sports leagues do have the
right of publicity independent of the athletes' right of publicity,
scores and statistics of games in progress are naturally component
282 See Pittsburgh Athletic, 24 F. Supp. at 492 (finding that defendant's communication of
news of the ball games interfered with the contractual right of advertisers to exclusively
broadcast the play-by-play account of games).
283 Sports Team Analysis, 939 F. Supp. at 1088; see supra notes 277-80 and accompanying
text (discussing the applicability of the exception for news accounts to Motorola).
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parts of these leagues' marketable identity. That the leagues li-
cense certain media entities to disseminate these scores and statis-
tics does not alter the leagues' interests in this information.
